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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Except for the Massachusetts case which requires a "labor market
monopoly" before granting relief, it appears that even in states not hav-
ing statutes to protect the right to work a man can obtain relief against
a union holding a closed shop contract that will not grant him member-
ship.
LEO M. McDONNELL
Practice-Estoppel to Deny Jurisdiction of Federal Court After
Removal Without Right-Plaintiff, a citizen of Texas, brought ac-
tion in a state court of Texas against the American Fire and Casualty
Company, a Florida corporation, the Indiana Lumbermen's Mutual In-
surance Company, an Indiana corporation, and one Reiss, her insurance
broker, who was also a citizen of Texas, to recover in the alternative
on one of the two insurance policies or from Reiss for damage to her
house caused by a fire. The action was removed to the United States
District Court on the petition of the two insurance companies where
judgment was entered against the American Fire and Casualty Company
which then appealed. Held: There was no right of removal under 28
U.S.C.A. §1441, and the defendant was not estopped from protesting
the lack of jurisdiction of the district court although it itself had in-
voked it. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 71 S.Ct. 534 (1951).
The Supreme Court in reviewing this code section on certiorari
held that there was no right of removal since there was no diversity of
citizenship between the plaintiff and one of the defendants, Reiss, and
no "separate and independent claim or cause of action which would be
removable if sued upon alone," the plaintiff having suffered only one
wrong and being entitled to only one relief. The question then arose
whether a defendant who had removed a suit to a federal court was
estopped from appealing from an adverse judgment on the grounds
that the court was without jurisdiction to render a judgment because
there was no right of removal.
As a rule the parties before the court may waive a lack of jurisdic-
tion over their persons and proceed to trial as long as the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. The party invoking
the jurisdiction is then concluded by the judgment and estopped to pro-
test the jurisdiction of the court.1 Thus when the parties removing a
suit to a federal court have no right to remove it since they do not come
within the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. §1441, the court may retain the
action if it would have had original jurisdiction of it.2 This occurs
when a party is sued in his home state by a non-resident. In such case,
14160 A.L.R. 918.
2 HanleyMack v. Godchaux, 2 F. (2d) 435, 437 (6th Cir., 1924).
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RECENT DECISIONS
he has no right of removal because he is a resident of the state in which
the action is brought, but the diversity of citizenship would give the
federal court original jurisdiction. In such case the party against whom
judgment is rendered is held estopped from protesting the right of re-
moval since the estoppel does not attempt to endow the federal court
with jurisdiction it could not otherwise possess.3
On the other hand if a court does not have jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter of an action, consent of the parties will not give it jurisdic-
tion.4 In such case it is immaterial how the lack of jurisdiction came
to the knowledge of the court and it is no valid objection that the party
protesting the jurisdiction was also the one who invoked it.5 Thus if
the federal court would not have had original jurisdiction of the cause,
the party removing it without right is not estopped from later protest-
ing the lack of jurisdiction of the court. The principle behind this rul-
ing is that the judicial power of the United States has been precisely
defined in the Constitution and must not be extended even though all
parties to a case desire it.6 It is the duty of the court to see that it has
jurisdiction, and it is an error to render a judgment in a case to which
its jurisdiction does not extend.7 Although a judgment will not be re-
versed for an error in process which was to the advantage of the ap-
pellant, an error to his advantage relating to the jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter must be rectified by the court.8
Thus in some cases the dispute may resolve itself as to whether the
federal court would have had original jurisdiction of the cause. In the
principal case Mr. Justice Reed, expressing the majority opinion, states
that the federal court would at no time have had original jurisdiction
of the suit since Reiss was present at the time of judgment and the judg-
ment finally adjudicated the merits of the litigation against him.9 On
the other hand, Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, believes that since
judgment was found against the American Fire and Casualty alone and
Reiss was dismissed, the effect is the same as if the plaintiff had brought
the suit in the district court against the insurance company alone, in
which case the court would have had jurisdiction.0 The weight of his
reasoning lies in the fact that the petitioning insurance company itself
occasioned the removal of the suit. Judgment was found against it
alone, and it is not a resident of the state where the action was brought.
'Baggs v. 'Martin, 179 U.S. 206, 21 S.Ct. 109, 45 L.Ed. 155 (1900).
4Peoples Bank of Belleville v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260-261, 26 L.Ed. 101(1880) ; see Baggs v. Martin, supra, note 3.
5 Supra, note 1.
Mansfield C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 383, 4 S.Ct. 510, 512, 28
L.Ed. 462 (1884).
7 Wildman v. Rider, 23 Conn. 172, 176 (1854).
s Capron v. Van Noorden, 2 Cranch 126, 2 L.Ed. 229 (1804).
9 28 U.S.C. §1332, 28 U.S.C.A. §1332 (1948).
10 Ibid.
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Hence the fact that one of the defendants was a resident of Texas is a
mere irregularity as to it, and to permit it to raise such an irregularity
after it has consented to it and permitted judgment to ensue would
seem abusive of ordinary concepts of justice.
In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Douglas follows Bailey v.
Texas Co." However the facts in that case were somewhat different
from the case at hand. Again there was no diversity of citizenship be-
cause one of the defendants was a resident of the state where the action
was brought. A non-resident defendant obtained removal to a federal
court where the resident defendant appeared, but the complaint was
dismissed as to it before the issues were put to the jury. Appealing from
an adverse verdict, the non-resident defendant raised the question of
the jurisdiction of the federal court. It was held that there was no right
of removal since there was no diversity of citizenship, but the court said:
"We need not consider whether the actions against the steamship
companies were ever before the District Court; they were dis-
missed, and the plaintiff has not appealed.' 12
Thus the court in that case seemed to base its reasoning on the fact that
at the time of judgment there was diversity of citizenship. Hence Mr.
Justice Douglas' proposal that a non-resident defendant should be
estopped to protest the right of removal as long as judgment was not
rendered against a resident defendant would be a new step towards
widening the estoppel doctrine, and the majority ruling that there can
be no estoppel when the federal court would not have had original jur-
isdiction of the suit at the time of judgment more clearly follows the
line of previously decided cases.
JOHN M. GROGAN
11 Bailey v. Texas Co., 47 F. (2d) 153 (2d Cir., 1931).
' 
2 bid, p. 155.
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